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A Comparison of United States and Japanese
Practices
by H. William Tanaka*
and
B. Jenkins Middletont
I. INTRODUCTION
A mericans have developed a love-hate relationship with Japanese
industry. They love Japanese automobilies, motorcycles, television
sets, radios and numerous other high-quality products. Americans buy
Japanese products in large quantities and at reasonable prices. Americans
admire the Japanese management style and work habits which they be-
lieve are largely responsible for the high quality and low prices of these
products. Yet, they blame Japanese industry for taking away their jobs
and the productive capacity in American industries. They increasingly
charge Japan with unfair trade practices such as predatory pricing,
dumping and subsidization. More ominously, Americans fear that Japan
is stealing their economic future, not only in causing U.S. basic industries
to wither, but by overtaking its lead in high-technology industries
through a targeted industrial policy.
These fears have been intensified by a series of recessions and grow-
ing unemployment, particularly since the first "oil shock" in 1973. Rising
demands for protection against imports, especially in declining or "sun-
set" industries and mature-technology industries such as auto and steel,
have combined with calls for greater government involvement in the pro-
* Senior Member, Tanaka, Walders & Ritger; B.A., University of California at Los An-
geles (1950); J.D., George Washington University School of Law (1953); LL.M., George
Washington University School of Law (1954).
t Member, Tanaka, Walders & Ritger, B.A., Princeton University (1949); J.D., Harvard
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motion of high-technology "sunrise" industries. These demands call for
something approaching an implicit American industrial policy. The re-
lated issues of coping with import competition, assisting the adjustment
of declining industries, renovating the production base of mature-technol-
ogy industries and shifting resources into the industries of the future
have moved to the forefront of both the public consciousness and the po-
litical stage.
In keeping with this country's free-market, laissez-faire capitalism
traditions over the years, the U.S. government's approach in dealing with
these problems has been narrow and fragmented, lacking continuity and
coherence. Generally speaking, the government does not intervene with
respect to rising imports unless an interested private party brings an ac-
tion for import relief under the escape clause,1 considered a "fair" trade
statute, or one of the laws dealing with unfair trade practices. Aside from
action taken under these laws and ad hoc assistance, such as that af-
forded Lockheed and Chrysler by special legislation, the government of-
fers little help to mature industries suffering from, or threatened with,
depressed conditions.2 What little help is offered is often fragmented and
uncoordinated.$ Despite the widely-acknowledged need to shift resources
from low-growth, technologically backward industries,4 which consume
high ratios of labor, materials and energy, into high-growth, high-technol-
ogy and information-intensive industries, which will provide the jobs and
economic leadership of the future,5 government support for these leading-
edge industries is largely confined to defense procurement and assistance
to defense-oriented and non-fossil-fuel energy research and development.'
The Japanese government's approach to these issues is rooted in its
own traditions and decision-making process, strives for consensus and
permits a higher degree of government participation in the economy. Ja-
pan's approach tends to be more comprehensive than that of the United
States. Japan provides "positive adjustment" through macroeconomic
"indicative planning" and microeconomic industrial policy.1 Industry
1 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (1976).
2 The Trade Adjustment Assistance Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2354 (1976), which never
provided significant assistance to firms, is moribund. See, e.g., Comment, Letting Obsolete
Firms Die: Trade Adjustment Assistance in the United States and Japan, 22 HARv. INT'L
L.J. 595, 598-603 (1981). President Reagan's Fiscal 1984 budget would terminate its funding.
U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 562 (Feb. 2, 1983).
3 Reich, Making Industrial Policy, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 852, 877 (1982).
4 Id. at 863.
5 Id. at 863-864.
6 Id. at 864.
7REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL TO THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE UNITED
STATES CONGRESS, INDUSTRIAL POLICY: JAPAN'S FLEXmLE APPROACH, GAO/ID-82-32 (June 23,
1982) [hereinafter cited as GAO INDUSTmIAL POLICY REPORT].
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problems and potential, whether related to import competition, loss of
comparative advantage, or the needs of an infant industry, are dealt with
in their totality. Imports are not singled out as the sole factor to receive
government attention.
This article compares the nature and effectiveness of the approaches
employed by the United States and Japan and suggests how the Ameri-
can approach can be improved, particularly with regard to escape-clause
relief from increased imports.8
II. THE UNITED STATES' IMPORT-TRIGGERED APPROACH
According to the most recent legislative history.
The rationale for the "escape clause" has been, and remains, that as bar-
riers to international trade are lowered, some industries and workers in-
evitably face serious injury, dislocation and perhaps economic extinction.
The "escape clause" is aimed at providing temporary relief for an indus-
try suffering from serious injury, or the threat thereof, so that the indus-
try will have sufficient time to adjust to the freer international
competition.'
Any private "representative of an industry," which may be a trade associ-
ation, a single firm, a union or a group of workers, may petition the Inter-
national Trade Commission (Commission) for "eligibility for import re-
lief."10 The petition triggers "an investigation to determine whether an
article is being imported... in such increased quantities as to be a sub-
stantial cause"-" (one which is "important and no less than any other
' The escape clause is the only import relief law discussed since this article focuses on
the health of industries and the industrial adjustment process. The principal objective of
the escape clause is to facilitate "the orderly transfer of resources to alternative uses and
other means of adjustment to new conditions of competition." 19 U.S.C. § 2251(a)(1) (1976).
This objective is to be accomplished by providing the quantum of relief from increased im-
ports (which need not be due to unfair practices) "necessary to prevent or remedy" actual or
threatened serious injury. Id. § 2251(d)(1)(A). Remedies, in the form of duties, under the
antidumping and countervailing duty laws are designed merely to neutralize the particular
unfair practice. Dumping duties are assessed at the amount by which the foreign market
value of the merchandise found to be dumped exceeds the United States price. 19 U.S.C. §
1673 (1981). Countervailing duties are to be in the amount of the net subsidy found or
estimated. Id. § 1671(a). Actual or threatened material injury to the industry in question is
relevant only as a necessary precondition (except in the case of material retardation of the
establishment of an industry) to relief under the antidumping and countervailing duty laws.
See id. § 1671(a)(2), 1673(2).
9 S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 119 (1974). Despite the report's reference to
lowering of barriers to international trade, the Trade Reform Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
618, to which the report related, for the first time abolished the requirement that the in-
creased imports justifying import relief be caused by trade concessions. Id. at 120.
10 19 U.S.C. § 2251(a)(1) (1976).
11 Id.
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cause"' 12) of actual or threatened serious injury to the domestic industry
producing a "like or directly competitive"' 3 article. The petition must
specifically state the objectives of the requested import relief, such as fa-
cilitating resource transfers to alternative uses and other means of adjust-
ment. 14 The Commission is required to investigate and report on, inter
alia, efforts undertaken by the industry's firms and workers "to compete
more effectively with imports."'3
In reaching its determination, the Commission must consider all eco-
nomic factors it deems relevant.' Specifically, the Commission must take
into account certain static criteria: the existence of idle plants, low profits
and significant unemployment or underemployment in determining
whether serious injury already exists; 7 the existence of sales declines,
higher inventories and downward trends in production, profits, wages or
employment in assessing the threat of injury;' 8 and an actual or relative
increase in imports in determining whether imports are a substantial
cause of actual or threatened injury.' 9 If the Commission makes an af-
firmative determination, it recommends to the President either the impo-
sition of duties or import restrictions sufficient to prevent or remedy seri-
ous injury,20 or trade adjustment assistance." The President must
provide some form of import relief if the Commission's determination is
affirmative, unless he determines that relief is contrary to the "national
economic interest."2 2 He may take into account whatever factors he con-
siders relevant in deciding what action to take.23 However, he is required
to consider, inter alia: the probable effectiveness of the import relief in
12 Id. § 2251(b)(4). The original escape clause statute, enacted in Section 7 of the Trade
Agreements Extension Act of 1951, 65 Stat. 73, required that increased imports "result in
whole or in part" from duty or customs treatment reflecting a trade agreement concession,
and contribute substantially toward causing or threatening serious injury. Section 301(b)(1)
and (3) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (1962) (codi-
fied at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1991 (1964)), stiffened the causation test, requiring that increased
imports be attributable "in major part" to trade agreement concessions and be "the major
factor" in causing or threatening serious injury. These provisions were in effect until 1974.
-3 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1) (1976). Investigation may also be triggered by the request of
the President or U.S. Trade Representative, a resolution of the House Ways and Means
Committee or Senate Finance Committee, or on the Commission's own motion. Id.
4 Id. § 2251(a)(1).
15 Id. § 2251(b)(5).
Is Id. § 2251(b)(2).
1 Id. § 2251(b)(2)(A).
Is Id. § 2251(b)(2)(B).
19 Id. § 2251(b)(2)(C).
20 Id. § 2251(d)(1)(A).
21 Id. § 2251(d)(1)(B).
22 Id. § 2252(a)(1)(A). In this case Congress may override the President's decision and
put into effect the import relief recommended by the Commission. Id. § 2253(c)(1).
21 Id. § 2252(c).
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promoting adjustment;24 the industry's own efforts to adjust; 25 the im-
pact of import relief on consumers,28 competition 27 and U.S. international
economic interests;2 possible foreign retaliation or demands for compen-
sation, as permitted by international agreements;29 and, the economic and
social costs to taxpayers, communities and workers by granting or with-
holding import relief.30 Import relief may be in the form of duties,3 1 quo-
tas or other quantitative restrictions, 32 a tariff-rate quota,3 3 orderly mar-
keting agreements with other countries34 or any combination of these."
The import relief granted may not exceed five years36 and may be re-
newed for another three years.
37
Whether the escape clause is viewed as effective legislation depends
upon one's perspective. It no doubt provides a useful means of relieving
the political pressures created by increased imports. Giving industries ac-
cess to the Commission, as a forum for airing complaints regarding in-
creases in imports, takes much of the pressure off Congress, which previ-
ously had been the only body which could provide relief.3 8 The
availability of the escape clause procedures also has permitted negotiated
reduction of tariffs and has diminished the pressures on the Executive
Branch to enter into ad hoc agreements and arrangements to reduce
imports. 9
The usefullness of the escape clause is far less clear, however, if one
is more interested in limiting imports or assisting the adjustment of in-
jured industries than in providing a political safety valve. The principal
in-depth study on this subject concluded that import relief under the es-
2. Id. § 2252(c)(3).
25 Id.
26 Id. § 2252(c)(4).
27 Id.
28 Id. § 2252(c)(5).
29 Id. § 2252(c)(6).
30 Id. § 2252(c)(9).
31 Id. § 2253(a)(1).
32 Id. § 2253(a)(3).
23 Id. § 2253(a)(2).
34 Id. § 2253(a)(4).
35 Id. § 2253(a)(5).
36 Id. § 2253(h)(1).
37 Id. § 2253(h)(3).
" In the automobile case, however, a negative Commission determination was followed
by pressure on the Congress and the Administration and, in turn, the Japanese government.
As a result, the latter imposed "voluntary" export restraints on Japanese automobiles. See
U.S. INT'L TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON INVESTIGATION No. TA-201-44,
CERTAIN MOTOR VEHICLES AND CERTAIN CHASSIS AND BODIES THEREFOR, U.S.LT.C. Pub. No.
1110, 45 Fed. Reg. 85,194 (1980); Recent Development, Car Wars: Auto Imports and the
Escape Clause, 13 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 591, 614 (1981).
29 See Recent Development, supra note 38.
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cape clause has not been notably effective in either of these respects.4
The study, conducted by the Commission which administers the escape
clause, in effect damns with faint praise. The study concluded that, in
most of the five major cases studied, import relief caused a moderate re-
duction in imports which "probably slowed the decline of the contracting
industries . . . may also have contributed to the orderly transfer of re-
sources to other uses ... [and] probably encouraged the increase in in-
vestment and subsequent competitiveness of" the one industry (bicycles)
which successfully modernized during the period of escape clause relief.41
The Commission's study analyzed the results of the import relief
granted to five industries: bicycles, sheet glass, stainless steel flatware,
watches and Wilton and velvet carpets.42 The study posits that "adjust-
ment" to injury from import competition occurs when, without the crutch
of protection, the industry's state of injury has ended.43 Adjustment re-
" U.S. IN'sL TRADE COMMISSION, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ESCAPE CLAUSE RELIEF IN PRO-
MOTING ADJUSTMENT TO IMPORT COMPETITION (Investigation No. 332-115), U.S.I.T.C. Pub.
No. 1229, at vi-vii, 86 (Mar. 1982) [hereinafter cited as U.S.I.T.C. ESCAPE CLAUSE REIE
REPORT].
41 Id. at vi.
42 Although hardly key industries to the nation's economy, these cases were selected for
study because they were the largest industries (with one exception) to receive escape-clause
relief prior to 1975, as well as having received prolonged relief (an average of twelve years).
Moreover, perspective on the adjustment process was possible because over twenty years
had elapsed since relief was first granted in each case. Id. at vi, 4.
Between 1951 and 1980, the Tariff Commission and its successor, the U.S. International
Trade Commission, instituted 184 escape clause cases, deciding 60 affirmatively and 17 more
by an evenly split vote (under which relief is possible, 19 U.S.C. § 1330(d)(1) (1976)). In the
77 cases recommending or permitting import relief, the President granted relief (sometimes
in the form of trade adjustment assistance only) in 30 and denied it in 47. GENERAL Ac-
COUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNTED STATES, CHANGES NEEDED IN
ADMINISTERING RELIEF TO INDUSTRIES HURT BY OvERsEAS COMPETITION, GAO Doc. No. ID-
81-42, at 3 (Aug. 5, 1981) [hereinafter cited as GAO ESCAPE CLAUSE ADMINISTRATION RE-
PORT]. In most cases decided before 1970, the Commission and the President denied relief
because they found an insufficient causal connection between either trade concessions and
increased imports or increased imports and injury. Metzger, The Escape Clause and Ad-
justment Assistance: Proposals and Assessments, 1 LAw & POL'VY INT'L BUs. 352, 365-367
(1970). In most of the 13 cases between 1974 and 1981 in which the President rejected the
recommended import relief on "national economic interest" grounds, he based his decision
on considerations of higher costs to consumers, industry improvements, probable retaliation,
or possible effects on U.S. efforts to reduce international trade barriers. [Reference file] U.S.
IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 58:0106 (June 2, 1982). Congress has never overridden the Presi-
dent's rejection of a Commission recommendation and voted to implement import relief.
U.S.I.T.C. ESCAPE CLAUSE RELIEF REPORT, supra note 40, at 4.
43 U.S.I.T.C. ESCAPE CLAUSE RELIEF REPORT, supra note 40, at 6. There is, however, no
general agreement on what adjustment means, either in general or as applied to specific
industries seeking escape clause relief. GAO EScAPE CLAUSE ADMINISTRATION REPORT, supra
note 42, at 2, 39. The ITC definition is so broad as to be almost useless in attempting to
specify the elements of an adjustment strategy.
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sults either through industry contraction (with only competitive firms
surviving), modernization or a combination of the two.44 Import protec-
tion is supposed to give a contracting industry more time to shrink, re-
ducing the harm to idled workers and extending the useful life of machin-
ery and invested capital. In addition, if the industry is capable of
modernizing, import relief is intended to afford it the time and cash flow
required to make the reinvestments."
The problem is, of course, that shielding an industry from competi-
tion may delay rather than speed up adjustment.4 6 Conditioning escape
clause relief upon a finding that an industry is suffering or threatened
with serious injury, and establishing static criteria for making these de-
terminations, tend to assure that successful applicants for relief will be
mature industries. These mature industries are more inclined to maintain
the status quo than to move vigorously into new production technologies,
product lines and customer bases. 47 This is true notwithstanding the leg-
islative history which states that "[t]he escape clause is not intended to
protect industries which fail to help themselves become more competitive
through reasonable research and investment efforts, steps to improve pro-
ductivity and other measures that competitive industries must continu-
ally undertake.'4 Thus, the two key questions in assessing the possible
utility of escape clause relief are: (1) what are the industry's realistically
achievable long-term prospects; and, (2) how will the owners and workers
use the time afforded by the import relief?
A. International Trade Commission Escape Clause Relief Report
1. Wilton and Velvet Carpet Industry
Some of the limitations of escape clause relief as an industry adjust-
ment tool are illustrated by the cases studied by the International Trade
Commission. For example, the industry engaged in weaving Wilton and
velvet carpets received relief in 1962.4 1 The relief was in the form of a
tariff increase.8 0 However, by 1962 Wilton and velvet carpets were in the
process of being displaced by a domestic substitute, tufted carpets. This
substitute was produced by a new technology which resulted in much
lower production costs. Though imports declined sharply, so did produc-
44 U.S.I.T.C. ESCAPE CLAUSE RELIEF REPORT, supra note 40, at 6-13.
45 Id. at 11.
4" Id.; GAO ESCAPE CLAUSE ADMINISTRATION REPORT, supra note 42, at 40; Reich, supra
note 3, at 855-56.
47 Reich, supra note 3, at 856-57.
48 S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 9, at 122.
49 U.S.I.T.C. ESCAPE RELIEF CLAUSE REPORT, supra note 40, at 14. For a comprehensive
look at adjustment in the Wilton and velvet carpet industry, see id. at 14-26.
11 Id. at 14.
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tion of Wilton and velvet carpets. The import relief simply did not ad-
dress the industry's basic problem. Nevertheless, the study concluded
that the decline in imports may have slowed contraction sufficiently to
help the carpet manufacturers shift from the old to the new technology
and may have raised revenues above what they otherwise might have
been.52 But escape clause relief was, according to the report, "at best a
secondary factor in shaping the final outcome [since] the main cause of
the contraction was of domestic origin.11s2
2. Sheet Glass Industry
The sheet glass industry also received escape clause relief in 1962
through an approximate doubling of tariff rates.53 This protection lasted
until 1974. In 1958, however, float glass, a new type of flat glass with the
desirable properties of plate glass yet less expensive to produce, was de-
veloped in England. Production of float glass began in the United States
in 1963 and rapidly replaced plate glass production. By 1972, when the
technology for producing thin window glass by this method had been de-
veloped, domestic float glass production equaled that of sheet glass and
rapidly outdistanced it thereafter." Thus, over the period of approxi-
mately a decade the flat glass industry was totally transformed by the
substitution of float glass for both plate and sheet glass. This transition
was slowed less by the import restrictions in force than by the high cost
of the new technology and equipment necessary to develop float glass
production.55 The sheet glass producers did invest heavily in float glass
facilities, some with the help of loans extended under the trade adjust-
ment assistance program. The study concluded that import protection ap-
parently reduced sheet glass imports and probably helped the industry
sustain itself while contracting during the relief period, but other factors,
such as the housing boom of the early 1970's, also aided the industry."
3. Bicycle Industry
The bicycle industry adjusted by modernizing. Escape clause relief
granted to the industry in 1955 raised tariffs.5 7 The tariffs were reduced
81 Id. at 25.
52 Id. at 26.
53 Id. at 27. The domestic manufacturers promptly raised their prices by an amount
exceeding the tariff increase, thereby opting to use it as a subsidy rather than as a vehicle
for recapturing market share. For a comprehensive analysis of adjustment in the sheet glass
industry, see id. at 27-42.
Id. at 38.
55 Id. at 39-40.
- Id. at 38, 42.
5 Id. at 43. For a comprehensive look at adjustment in the bicycle industry, see id. at
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in stages between 1967 and 1972. In 1955 most American bicycles were of
the balloon-tire type; those made in Europe were lightweights. At about
that time, the domestic industry began a concerted effort to modernize its
facilities and adopt a more aggressive marketing strategy, including the
introduction of a middleweight bicycle to compete with the increasingly
popular lightweight imports from Europe. Imports declined in the first
few years of import relief, but then resumed their increase.5 Neverthe-
less, the domestic industry remained healthy because of the steady
growth in the domestic demand for bicycles. Growth in demand was at-
tributed to the increase in the number of children of bicycle-riding age,
rising per capita income, the growth of suburbs, and, in the 1970's, the
explosive growth in the popularity with adults of bicycles, particularly the
10-speed lightweights.59 The industry experienced large increases in pro-
duction, consumption, capital investment and new plants. The least com-
petitive companies disappeared.
The study's highly speculative conclusions regarding the role of im-
port protection in the industry's growth and adjustment stated that "the
coincidence of increased investment and productivity suggests that [im-
port relief] was helpful in promoting a modernization type of adjustment"
but noted that the "other favorable circumstances" contributed to the re-
sult.6o One is left to wonder not only whether the bicycle industry would
not have adopted the successful strategies it did even without import re-
lief, but also whether the industry was at any time, in fact, suffering the
injury necessary to qualify for escape clause relief.0 1
4. Watch Industry
The watch industry has undergone several transformations in the
three decades since since jeweled-lever and pin-lever watches received es-
cape clause relief. The relief was in the form of highter tariffs and re-
mained in effect until 1967.62 Consumer preference shifted from jeweled-
lever watches to less-expensive pin-lever watches during the 1950's and
1960's. Since 1976 "nonconventional" digital and quartz analog watches
have captured a major segment of the domestic market.
43-57.
I' Id. at 46, Table 14.
5 Id. at 47-48.
" Id. at 57.
" In fact, the Tariff Commission, following a second petition by the domestic producers
for escape clause relief in 1957, determined that bicycles were not being imported in such
increased quantities as to cause or threaten serious injury warranting a further tariff in-
crease. Id. at 44.
1 Id. at 58. For a complete discussion of adjustment in the watch industry, see id. at
58-70.
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After the tariffs were raised, imports of jeweled-lever watches de-
clined while pin-lever watch imports roseY3 At the same time the domes-
tic market was taken over by both domestic and imported pin-lever
watches. Domestic production of jeweled-lever watches virtually ended. In
addition, three out of four domestic producers of pin-lever watches also
discontinued production by 1967, as Timex emerged as the dominant, and
now sole surviving, producer of conventional watches in the United
States.6 4 Timex's success is attributed to its decision to add style to an
inexpensive pin-lever watch, a low-margin, high-volume strategy with in-
tensive advertising, highly automated production processes and parts
standardization. In effect, Timex created a new domestic industry which
ran away from the domestic competition. However, the overall industry
adjustment process was one of contraction, particularly in the jeweled-
lever segment. 5 Import protection had little effect on the pin-lever seg-
ment; at best, it reduced the pressures on the jeweled-lever manufactur-
ers, thus allowing them to contract gradually.66
5. Stainless Steel Table Flatware Industry
In 1957 there were 21 domestic manufacturers of stainless steel table
flatware (SSTF).67 Many of these manufacturers were diversified compa-
nies producing other tableware products, including sterling silver and sil-
ver-plated flatware. An escape clause petition filed in 1957 led to a tariff
rate quota (TRQ) on SSTF imports in 1959, complementing a Japanese
voluntary quota on exports to the United States imposed in 1958.68 The
TRQ remained in effect until 1967 and was reimposed at a lower level
and under authority other than the escape clause" from 1971 to 1976.
The first TRQ and the Japanese restraints successfully held down im-
ports. Domestic consumption doubled and the domestic industry flour-
ished. The second lower-level TRQ proved inadequate, however, to offset
the lower prices and thereby to keep down imports of SSTF from Japan,
Taiwan and Korea. Although U.S. domestic consumption continued to in-
crease, the domestic industry contracted, with most firms ceasing produc-
tion of SSTF; only Oneida, Ltd., prospered. Oneida, Ltd. invested in new
equipment to improve its productivity in the manufacture of high-quality
SSTF.
03 Id. at 61.
6 Id. at 65-69.
65 Id. at 69.
66 Id. at 69-70.
11 Id. at 71. For a comprehensive analysis of adjustment in the stainless steel table
flatware industry, see id. at 71-82.
68 Id. at 73.
69 Id. at 74.
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The study concluded that the protection afforded the industry prob-
ably extended the adjustment period and reduced its costs, although ex-
panding domestic consumption had the same effect.7 0 While the particu-
lar segments of the carpet, glass and watch industries investigated by the
Commission suffered from product substitution, or "technological preda-
tion," stainless steel flatware gained by displacing more expensive and
higher profit silver-plated flatware and, to a lesser extent, even higher
profit sterling silver flatware. 1 The domestic industry contracted because
the import relief provided could not overcome the high cost of domestic
labor and raw materials. Many of the domestic producers left the flatware
business entirely because of the erosion of profit margins in the industry.
6. Conclusion
In summing up, the Commission noted that in four of the five indus-
tries the majority of firms, or the part producing the protected product,
left the industry.72 However, many of these, particularly the larger ones,
succeeded in shifting their resources to alternative uses.73 Although con-
ceding that "any statement on the effect of the escape clause contains an
element of speculation," the Commission concluded that "[e]scape clause
protection probably had a positive, but relatively minor, effect."74 Finally,
and most significantly.
[L]ooking back at what happened to the five industries over a long pe-
riod of time, one observes how relatively little effect escape-clause relief
had on firm adjustment either because so much of the firm's injury was
caused by non-import-related factors, or because the decline of imports
following the relief was small.75
B. Domestic Television Industry
An ongoing and more widely-publicized import controversy, regard-
ing the domestic television industry, leads to similar conclusions. Here,
70 Id. at 81.
7' Id. at 82. The above examples demonstrate the critical importance of how the "in-
dustry" is defined in an escape clause case. If, for example, the industries investigated had
been defined as "carpets," "flat glass" and "table flatware" instead of "Wilton and velvet
carpets," "sheet glass" and "stainless steel table flatware," respectively, the results doubt-
less would have been very different. The narrow legal definitions tend to obscure the eco-
nomic realities revealed by using the broader definition, resulting in relief which may be
unwarranted economically.
72 Id. at 85.
73 Id. at 85-86.
74 Id. at 86.
75 Id.
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too, import relief has not addressed the basic problems of the domestic
industry. Moreover, the television industry has failed to use to its best
advantage the respite from import competition afforded it not only under
the escape clause but the antidumping law7" and section 337 of the Tariff
Act of 1930.7 7
Despite this panoply of import relief, the domestic monochrome
(black-and-white) television set industry continued its flight offshore to
Taiwan. Virtually no monochrome sets are now produced in the United
States. The color television industry also has lost substantial market
share to imports for several reasons. Major domestic producers lagged be-
hind the Japanese in shifting from tube and hybrid types to cost-efficient,
upgraded, and more portable, fully solid-state circuitry. They doggedly
adhered to an outmoded market strategy, refusing to sell custom design
televisions under private labels to Sears Roebuck and other national mass
merchandising retail outlets. Thus, these retailers were forced to seek off-
shore sources to develop their growing private-label market. Finally, the
domestic industry was blind to the potential of the market for small-
screen portable television sets.
The underlying process operative in the television industry was tech-
nological predation. The heavy and cumbersome tube-type sets were dis-
placed by the truly portable, transistorized, smaller-screen television sets
which were lower in price and required less maintenance. These new tele-
vision sets created a second- and third-set mass market. No amount of
successful legal action in an import-relief proceeding could have enjoined
American consumers from preferring these sets. Relief and adjustment for
the domestic industry could only be achieved by rapid disinvestment
from the production of large tube-type console models and reinvestment
in automated production of the smaller solid-state sets.
C. International Trade Commission: Nonrubber Footwear Industry
This is not to say that the escape clause cannot be usefully invoked
to assist in this disinvestment/reinvestment process. There are instances
where this has been done with marked success. For example, in 1977 the
U.S. industry producing nonrubber footwear received escape clause re-
lief.L78 Four years later, in deciding whether to grant a requested extension
76 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1675 (Supp. V 1981) (originally enacted as the Antidumping Act of
1921, Pub. L. No. 67-10, 42 Stat. 11).
77 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976). The dumping finding, published in 1971, 36 Fed. Reg. 4597,
is still in effect. The escape clause action resulted in orderly marketing agreements with
Japan, Korea and Taiwan beginning in 1977 which have now terminated.
78 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMMISSION, INVESTIGATION RELATING TO FooTwARw (Investigation
No. TA-201-18), U.S.I.T.C. Pub. No. 799, 49 Fed. Reg. 9065 (1977) (determination of serious
injury).
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of relief, the International Trade Commission concluded that, while the
domestic industry had not completely solved its problems, it had used the
relief period to make substantial and largely successful efforts to become
more competitive and responsive to the market.79 The Commission cited
investments in new plants and equipment, major technological innova-
tions, including laser cutting and computer tape stitching, and improved
responsiveness to style changes as the reasons for the industry's success.
One Commissioner concluded that "It]he process of adjustment has had
positive results thus far, and with some further limited protection these
results should solidify."'80
D. Conclusion
Whether a domestic industry makes wise use of import relief, one can
scarcely blame it for invoking available protectionist "solutions" to
problems which arguably have some relationship to imports. The escape
clause and other import relief laws provide tempting avenues for creative
lawyers to obtain government assistance, which is available in virtually no
other institutionalized form to declining or injured industries. At the
same time, one should not be surprised to learn that import constraints
are largely irrelevant if imports are not in fact a major cause of the indus-
try's problems.
The doubtful or marginal results of even prolonged escape clause re-
lief in many cases may be partly due to flaws in the escape clause process.
Although theoretically the Commission's proceedings are investigative, in
fact they are more akin to adversarial legal proceedings, pitting the repre-
sentatives of firms or labor or both against importers and foreign manu-
facturers. Thus, they cater to the fallacy of the American legal mindset
that for every perceived injury there must be a legal remedy.81 There is
often no effective representation of consumers, distributors, or dealers,
while the government's role, in the form of the Commission, is that of
arbiter and judge. It is only after the Commission's determination of in-
jury that considerations of the national interest, as distinguished from the
interests of the petitioner, its industry, and its opposition, are injected by
the President in deciding upon final action.8 2 Moreover, whatever "ad-
79 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMUISSION, NONRUBBER FooTwsAx REPORT TO THE PRESMENT ON
INVESTIGATION No. TA-203-7 UNDER SECTION 203 OF THE TRADE AcT OF 1974, U.S.I.T.C.
Pub. No. 1139, at 7-9 (1981) (Statement of Chairman Alberger and Commissioners Calhoun
and Bedell).
80 Id. at 44 (Statement of Commissioner Stern).
81 See, e.g., Ehrenhaft, What the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Provisions of
the Trade Agreements Act [Can] [Will] [Should] Mean for U.S. Trade Policy, 11 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1361, 1402 (1979).
a2 The possibility of denying import relief on grounds of overriding national economic
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justment plans" may be submitted in response to the statutory require-
ment that a petitioner, which may or may not be truly representative of
its industry, state the purpose of seeking import relief tend to be "so
vague as to be virtually useless" as a measuring stick of later progress.8 3
In any event, no obligation is imposed upon the petitioner, much less the
entire industry, to follow whatever course the petitioner projects. Indeed,
if workers rather than management are the petitioners they will be inca-
pable of taking most of the actions, other than reducing wages and bene-
fits and altering work practices, which are normally required for
adjustment.8 4
To remedy these deficiencies, it has been suggested that (1) escape
clause relief should be conditioned on the submission of specific adjust-
ment strategies;8 5 (2) petitioners should be required to enter into binding
commitments to take the steps necessary to become competitive or other-
wise adjust; 6 and (3) one industry segment (such as management or la-
bor) should not be allowed to petition unless it is clear that commitments
from that segment will suffice to achieve adjustment.8 7 If the practical
and antitrust problems connected with these proposals could be over-
come, their adoption would serve to focus attention on the overall condi-
tion, actual intention and realistic capabilities of the industry. This would
underscore the need for positive action by management and labor to ad-
dress the industry's difficulties in their totality.
If the Commission's study of the results of escape clause relief is an
accurate reflection of the effectiveness of the present law and its prede-
cessors, one is left to wonder whether past escape clause proceedings may
have been largely a waste of both government and private resources." It
interest does, however, distinguish the escape clause from other import relief statutes. It has
been cogently argued that the rigidities inherent in the calculation of dumping duties are
such that the antidumping law should be repealed, leaving dumping cases to be handled
under the more flexible escape clause provision. Caine, A Case for Repealing the Antidump-
ing Provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930, 13 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 681, 726 (1981).
83 GAO ESCAPE CLAUSE ADMINISTRATION REPORT, supra note 42, at 39.
84 Id. at 39-41.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 40-41.
87 Id. at 52; see also Reich, supra note 3, at 859. The third requirement, that petition-
ers must be capable of bringing about adjustment, might make it impossible for firms other
than those in highly concentrated industries to file an escape-clause petition. Moreover, for
all industries the second and third requirements could raise serious antitrust problems, un-
less the Noerr-Pennington exemption applies to insulate from antitrust liability joint efforts
by a number of firms to achieve adjustment under the aegis of the escape clause. See East-
ern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr, 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United Mine Workers v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
" An assessment of the considerable cost of escape clause relief to consumers and other
segments of the economy is outside the scope of this article. Although no retaliation or
compensation payments have resulted from relief granted under the 1974 amendments, the
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seems apparent that the proceedings and any resulting relief may divert
industry attention and energies from the significant non-import causes of
its injury. The postponement of the necessary shifts in resources from
obsolete to emerging industries, which import relief may entail, is a costly
distortion affecting the entire economy, as well as American competitive-
ness in the world marketplace.
III. THE COMPREHENSIVE JAPANESE APPROACH
The Japanese approach to the problems and needs of declining and
emerging industries, and the relationship of import competition to each,
starts from an entirely different perspective than that of the United
States. American policy is minimalist, fragmented and negative, focusing
on the microeconomic, import-related problems of particular injured in-
dustries while largely ignoring the emerging industries. Japanese policy
begins with the formulation of a macroeconomic view of the desired direc-
tion of the entire economy and proceeds within that framework to ex-
amine the role of individual industries, considering among many other
factors the possible impact of imports on the industry.s9 Providing help to
industries in difficulty is merely one aspect of this macroeconomic "indic-
ative planning" and microeconomic industrial policy, adopted in postwar
Japan to rebuild basic industries. The system has been adapted, in view
of changed circumstances, to new goals of promoting high technology in-
dustries, furthering social goals, and providing help to "sunset" indus-
tries.9 0 The result is a comprehensive and flexible "positive adjustment
policy," which Robert Reich refers to as "managed adjustment."9 1 Recog-
nizing that emerging industries can ease the adjustment problems of de-
clining industries, the system features coordinated programs to assist in
the shift of resources from the latter to the former.
As for imports, despite Japan's well-known policy, at least until 1976,
of limiting imports to shelter growing industries,"2 import relief is not
often granted as a means of aiding adjustment of injured or declining in-
dustries. The Japanese government recognizes that to do so would relieve
possibilities of such action cannot be ignored. GAO ESCAPE CLAUSE ADMINISTRATION REPORT,
supra note 42, at 1.
89 See, e.g., GAO INDUSTRIAL POLICY REPORT supra note 7; Rapp, Japan: Its Industrial
Policies and Corporate Behavior, 22 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 38 (1977); Reich, supra note 3;
SUECOMM. ON TRADE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., HIGH
TECHNOLOGY AND JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL POLICY: A STRATEGY FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS (Comm.
Print 1980) (report prepared by Dr. Julian Gresser) [hereinafter cited as GRESSER REPORT].
90 GAO INDUSTRIAL POLICY REPORT, supra note 7, at 24.
"1 Reich, supra note 3, at 855.
- 91 See, e.g., GRESSER REPORT, supra note 89, at 18. It is noteworthy that while the Japa-
nese government once protected its industries from foreign competition, it has promoted
vigorous competition between Japanese companies. Reich, supra, note 3, at 867.
1983
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
the pressure on the industry to take the painful actions necessary to ad-
justment, thereby undercutting the government's leverage.9 3
In the postwar era the Japanese government has channeled invest-
ment, growth and change in the economy through monetary and fiscal
policies, indicative planning, and industrial policy.9 4 Indicative planning,
under the Economic Planning Agency, sets the macroeconomic forecast
for the Japanese economy through non-binding plans, approved by the
cabinet, whose purpose is to achieve a national consensus on long-range
objectives and to establish the means of accomplishing them.9 5 Industrial
policy, administered by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI), identifies the resource needs, and the means of promoting either
growth or decline, of selected key industries or industrial sectors."
MITI's Industrial Structure Council, consisting of representatives of vari-
ous Japanese constituencies, including government, industry, labor and
academia, drafts MITI's ten-year plans, or "MITI Visions," setting goals
and criteria for government support of industry.9
Specific tools utilized to achieve the established goals have included,
particularly in the early years, use of the banking and savings institutions
for rationing credit and assisting access to captial for selected industries,
the provision of loans and guarantees and imposition of controls on
capital flows and trade, including tariffs and quotas. 8 The government
continues to employ such devices as tax incentives, including exemptions
and allowances for specific industries; industrial targeting; and subsidies
for joint research and development efforts. It also serves as a clearing-
house for technical information, and it sanctions cartels, including "ra-
tionalization cartels," of limited duration for specified purposes, which re-
ceive exemptions from the Antimonopoly Law.99 In 1965, however, the
government began to liberalize its tight controls of trade, technology im-
ports, and capital movements so that today these controls have largely
disappeared, though some remain with respect to computer and other key
technology-intensive industries where there is a perceived need to close
technology gaps.' 0 The system now relies more than ever on incentives,
guidance and cooperation rather than compulsion, thereby taking advan-
93 GAO INDUSTRIAL POLICY REPORT, supra note 7, at 73.
9 Id. at 3-4.
95 Id. at 22-24; Rapp, supra note 89, at 41.
96 GAO INDUSTRIAL POLICY REPORT, supra note 7, at 4.
97 Id. at 28; Bendix, Interaction of Business and Government in Japan: Lessons for
the United States, 15 THE INT'L LAW. 571, 573-574 (1981).
9 Rapp, supra note 89, at 42-43; GAO INDUSTRIAL POLICY REPORT, supra note 7, at 6,
35-36.
" GAO INDUSTRIAL POLICY REPORT, supra note 7, at 45, 47, 53, 60-65, 69-71; Bendix,
supra note 97, at 578.
100 GAO INDUSTRIAL POLICY REPORT, supra note 7, at 42-44, 63.
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tage of the relatively collaborative relationship between government and
industry in Japan.101
The early post-war goals of reconstruction and independence of the
Japanese economy soon shifted to the objective of catching up with other
industrialized countries. In 1965, Japan began to focus on social develop-
ment and welfare. In 1975, Japanese policy shifted once again, to promot-
ing the stable development of the economy, coupled with improvements
in the quality of Japanese life.1 2 Today there is heavy emphasis on the
development of the technology-intensive, high-value-added, resource-con-
serving industries, particularly those whose products, such as computers,
have the potential for increasing productivity and upgrading the quality
of numerous other industries. 03 Financial assistance to industry is now
channeled more toward non-growth-promoting purposes, including assis-
tance in meeting environmental pollution control standards, conserving
resources and energy, and aiding the structurally depressed industries'
0 4
which were victims, largely, of the past decade's soaring energy costs and
Japan's rising wage rates as compared to those in Taiwan, South Korea,
Hong Kong and Singapore. 0 5 MITI, at the same time, devotes much of
its energy to restraining competitive industries' exports as well as to de-
pressed-industry adjustment. 08
The Japanese government's coordinated approach to assisting declin-
ing industries involves contractual obligations among industry, labor and
government with the express aim of bringing about adjustment through
resource shifts and tying together the adjustment of the workers and the
community with that of industry.10 In exchange for industry and worker
participation in adjustment, the government provides unemployment and
depressed-region assistance, including incentives to growth sectors to lo-
cate plants and facilities in depressed regions, as well as its usual forms of
insurance, retraining and job-hunting allowances. 08
Measures to counter short-term problems may include authorization
of an anti-recession or "production-reduction cartel."'109 Long-term
problems of competitiveness may be dealt with by scrapping excess ca-
101 Rapp, supra note 89, at 41; Bendix, supra note 97, at 580-81.
102 GAO INDUSTRIL POLicY REPORT, supra note 7, at 27.
103 Id. at 24-27, 47-65; Rapp, supra note 89, at 40, 46.
104 Bendix, supra note 97, at 580; GAO INDUSTRIAL POLICY REPORT, supra note 7, at 24;
Comment, supra note 2, at 603 n.57.
1o3 Boyer, How Japan Manages Declining Industries, 107 FORTUNE 58 (1983).
106 GAO INUSTRIAL POLICY REPORT, supra note 7, at 46.
101 Id. at 66; Reich, supra note 3, at 863.
108 GAO INDUSTRIAL POLICY REPORT, supra note 7, at 66, 69.
109 Id. at 69; MITI Official Claims Japanese Cartels Increase Rather Than Impede
Imports, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA) No. 22, at L-10 (Feb. 5, 1983) [hereinafter
cited as Japanese Cartels].
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pacity, modernization of production processes, or the shift of resources to
other lines of business, usually under a "reduction of capacity cartel."1 °
One of the basic underpinnings of this collaborative government-in-
dustry process is the Structurally Depressed Industries Law, passed in
1978.111 It permits an industry to be designated as a structurally de-
pressed industry provided that 50 percent of the firms in the industry are
in financial difficulty, excess plant capacity exists and firms representing
two-thirds of the industry petition for the designation.112 The designation
permits the relevant ministry to prepare a stablization plan in consulta-
tion with industry and labor representatives. The plan is subject to rejec-
tion or modification by the Japanese Fair Trade Commission (JFTC)
which regulates and maintains competition. 1 3 Approval by the JFTC,
however, exempts the industry from compliance with the Antimonopoly
Law, which is particularly important in implementing provisions for
scrapping or mothballing excess capacity by allocating reductions on a
firm-by-firm basis.1 1 4 Since Japan is no more immune than other coun-
tries from political and social constraints against phasing out established
industries, despite the wisdom of that course from a purely economic
standpoint, efforts may be made to try to revitalize the industry while at
the same time nudging workers and companies into other lines of
production." 5
The basic philosophy behind the Japanese system is that the risks in
salvaging declining industries should be spread as broadly as possible
among those who have the biggest stakes in the outcome, particularly the
manufacturing companies themselves and their principal investors, the
banks.11 6 Though the government may on occasion contribute some
financing, more often its role is catalytic, providing signals to the private
sector. 17 The cornerstone on which adjustment is built is the bargaining
relationship between business, government and labor.1 This relationship
leads to express agreement not only on the adjustment objective but on
110 See Japanese Cartels, supra note 109; GAO INDUSTRIAL POLICY REPORT, supra note
7, at 70.
"I Law No. 44 of 1978. For discussions of the Structurally Depressed Industry Law, see
GAO INDUSTRIAL POLICY REPORT, supra note 7, at 68; Boyer, supra note 105, at 58; Reich,
supra note 3, at 862.
112 GAO INDUSTRIAL POLICY REPORT, supra note 7, at 68. Eight industries have been so
designated to date: aluminum, cardboard, cotton and wool spinning, electric-furnace steel,
ferrosilicon, fertilizers, shipbuilding, and synthetic fibers; petrochemicals will probably be
added soon. Boyer, supra note 105, at 58.
113 GAO INDUSTRIAL POLICY REPORT, supra note 7, at 68.
11 Id. at 68-71; Boyer, supra note 105, at 59-60.
11 GAO INDUSTRIAL POLICY REPORT, supra note 5, at 71.
116 Boyer, supra note 105, at 61.
117 Id.
118 Reich, supra note 3, at 863.
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specific shifts in resources, which accommodate the needs of the indus-
try's workers and affected communities, as well as its firms.11 9 This com-
prehensive, consensual approach relieves pressures which might otherwise
be channeled into demands for protection from imports. The process is,
however, truly consensual; the government cannot compel the industry to
accept a stabilization program. 120 The process has, in fact, encountered
disagreements, long delays and sometimes stiff resistance in negotiating
adjustment programs in the shipbuilding, aluminum and electric-furnace
steel industries.
2 1
The benefits provided by the Japanese government focus on helping
small and medium-sized companies through preferential financing, gov-
ernment purchase of scrapped equipment, access to the Depressed Indus-
tries Credit Guaranty Fund 122 and allowing the formation of joint scrap-
ping associations to facilitate disposal of excess capacity. 23 The larger
firms, many of them diversified into other industries, are expected to cut
back without major government help aside from exemption from the An-
timonopoly Law.124 They are also expected to provide significant help to
the smaller companies, such as repaying adjustment loans made to the
smaller firms.125 The private sector has successfully shouldered the bur-
den of retraining and shifting workers, devoting to this purpose the pro-
ceeds of subsidies for scrapping excess capacity,12 6 as well as subsidies
under both the Employees in Structurally Depressed Industries Law127
and the Employment Insurance Law. 28 Growth industries have smoothed
adjustment by taking on employees laid off by declining industries, either
permanently or by "borrowing" employees still on the payroll of the de-
clining company until the adjustment process has been completed. 29
Observers tend to agree that the Japanese program for assistance to
depressed industries, while far from perfect, has worked relatively more
successfully than the fragmented, largely "hands-off" approach in the
United States. 30 The shipbuilding industry was successfully induced to
"I' Id. at 856, 863; GAO INDUSTRIAL POLICY REPORT, supra note 7, at 66, 71.
110 GAO INDusTmAm PoLicY REPORT, supra note 7, at 73.
121 Id. at 74; Boyer, supra note 105, at 61-62.
12 The Depressed Industries Credit Guaranty Fund was authorized under the Structur-
ally Depressed Industries Law in 1978. GAO INDUsTRIAL POLICY REPORT, supra note 7, at 68.
122 Boyer, supra note 105, at 60; GAO INDUSTRIAL POLICY REPORT, supra note 7, at 72.
124 GAO INDUSTRIAL POLICY REPORT, supra note 7, at 72.
2 Id.; Boyer, supra note 105, at 61.
126 Reich, supra note 3, at 862.
11 Law No. 95 of 1977; see Comment, supra note 2, at 604-605 n.62.
128 Law No. 116 of 1974; see Comment, supra note 2, at 604-607.
"2 Boyer, supra note 105, at 60; GAO INDUSTRIAL POLICY REPORT, supra note 7, at 75.
13O Reich, supra note 3, at 856, 862; Boyer, supra note 105, at 58, 63; Comment, supra
note 2, at 609-614, wherein the author praises the Japanese record in aiding workers and
communities but concludes that "the Japanese program for 'aiding' firms in depressed in-
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reduce capacity by 35 percent after lengthy consultations among the vari-
ous constituencies, including an advisory group comprised of representa-
tives of business and labor, as well as bankers, academics and journal-
ists.131 Employees were successfully transferred to other work.132 The
aluminum industry, overwhelmed by cheaper imports after the 1973 oil
shock drove up Japanese electricity costs,"3 dismantled 57 percent of its
capacity and much of the remainder is idle. It survives, however, because
of aluminum's status as a basic industry.'" Workers were shifted to par-
ents or affiliates."s 5 On the other hand, MITI guidelines have been in ef-
fect for the non-integrated electric-furnace steel industry for five years
and demand remains stagnant. Yet the industry's 60-odd companies have
actually expanded rather than contracted capacity during that time."'
As a device to require legislative reconsideration of the Structurally
Depressed Industries Law, one of its provisions called for the Japanese
Diet to enact repealing legislation by June 1983.137 MITI sought to re-
place the original law with one providing broader Antimonopoly Law im-
munity but was opposed by the Japanese Fair Trade Commission
(JFTC), which wanted the law eliminated."' The JFTC argued that the
law had not worked, that the results did not justify the antitrust exemp-
tions and that its application exacerbated Japan's relations with the
United States and with other trading partners." The two agencies ulti-
mately reached a compromise. The new law, effective last July, continues
to provide for the creation of officially-approved cartels, exempt from the
Antimonopoly Law, aimed at dismantling excess capacity. In addition,
the law now permits cooperation or consolidation of businesses, including
mergers but not cartelization, for the purpose of revitalizing an industry.
The later may, upon request, be granted official approval but not An-
timonopoly Law exemption.
United States government officials have expressed concern that ap-
plication of the Structurally Depressed Industries Law, particularly the
sanctioning of cartels, can have the effect of restricting imports into Ja-
dustries was economically less than prudent." Id. at 609. The author cited the excessive
reliance on economically inefficient cartels to keep alive some obsolete industries, such as
textiles. Id. at 609-614.
131 Boyer, supra note 105, at 59, 60.
132 Id. at 60.
1"3 Id. at 61.
134 Id. at 61-62.
139 Id. at 62.
126 Id.
1"1 Comment, supra note 2, at 610, n.88.
138 Okabe & Saida, Rescue Plan for Troubled Industries Draws Suspicion at Home and
Abroad, Japan Economic Journal, Jan. 25, 1983, at 6, col. 1; Boyer, supra note 105, at 58, 63.
139 Boyer, supra note 105, at 58-59, 63.
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pan.1 40 MITI officials argue that this is not so, noting that Japan's cartel
policy is a form of "positive adjustment policy," which has been accepted
by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, of
which the United States is a member. 4 To the contrary, the MITI offi-
cials assert that the effect is actually to increase imports by curtailing
production, thereby raising Japanese prices and giving imported goods a
competitive advantage.1 42 In any case, it seems likely that any import-
restrictive side effects of these Japanese policies are less pervasive than
the explicit import constraints imposed or induced by the U.S. govern-
ment in an attempt to aid depressed industries, such as the current "vol-
untary" restraints on exports to the United States of Japanese cars and
European steel.
IV. A POLICY-ORIENTED APPROACH
What lessons can be learned from this comparison of U.S. and Japa-
nese policies? It seems clear that a purely protectionist solution, such as
that represented by the escape clause, is not notably effective as a means
of coping with the complex problems of rising imports, declining indus-
tries and the need to shift resources into the industries of the future.
Such a solution focuses too much attention on imports, which is merely
one aspect of a larger problem and which case histories show may be a
relatively minor factor in determining an industry's future. Indeed, given
the dynamics of the economic process in Japan, it seems likely that in-
creased protection by the United States and European countries against
Japanese exports has, in the past, done less to help U.S. and European
industries than it has to accelerate Japan's investment shift out of low-
growth and into high-growth industries. By the same token, the recent
spate of world-wide protectionism to constrain Japan will stimulate Japa-
nese business toward achieving greater cost efficiencies and generating
more new products through increased basic research and development
efforts.
By contrast, the relative success of the comprehensive Japanese ap-
proach both to the nurturing of new industries and, more recently, foster-
ing adjustment in declining sectors argues for a broad approach in this
140 A high Commerce Department official, Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr., has said that the
U.S. government disapproves of the government's role in cartels because (1) an industrial
plan for a declining industry amounts to carving up the market, thereby determining the
import level; (2) designation as a depressed industry targets it as favored, signalling its cus-
tomers not to look elsewhere for supplies; and (3) some designated industries are connected
with the major trading houses which make decisions about imports. Japanese Cartels,
supra note 109, at L-11, L-12.
141 Id. at L-11.
242 Id. at L-10.
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country. Logically, such an approach would begin, as does the Japanese,
with the development of a broad national consensus on the general direc-
tion of the economy as a supplement to sound fiscal, monetary and tax
policies designed to keep inflation and interest rates low and promote
savings and investment. An articulated agreement on the likely future
role of not only the major economic sectors-manufacturing, agriculture
and services-but also broad industrial categories such as heavy and light
industry and high- technology, high-value-added industries, is desirable.
Such a consensus should indicate which industries are likely to grow and
possibly need nurturing and which ones are likely to decline and need
assistance and adjustment.
To some, however, such an undertaking would smack too much of
central economic planning and "creeping socialism. ' 143 But Japanese "in-
dicative planning" is just that-indicative, not mandatory. It should be
possible for a presidentially-appointed commission of leaders from both
the public and private sectors to perform a similar, essentially advisory
function on an ongoing basis without transforming our free-market sys-
tem into a planned economy, on the one hand, or raising unwarranted
expectations of Utopia on the other. Industry is already heavily influ-
enced by, and dependent upon, government, particularly with regard to
macroeconomic monetary and fiscal policies which create an economic en-
vironment conducive to achieving growth and prosperity. Indeed, the dif-
ference between "planning" and the "free market" may be merely a dif-
ference in degree. Robert Reich has commented:
Our collective inability to organize ourselves for economic change stems
largely from ideological blinders which severely limit our vision, forcing
us to engage in an endless debate over the relative merits of two artificial
categories: the "free" market, or centralized national "planning." The
real choice is between adjustment or protection. 1 4
Yet even without an indicative macroeconomic plan it should be pos-
sible for the United States to move in the direction of support for sunrise
industries and managed adjustment for obsolete industries, restructuring
or scaling down mature-technology industries to make them competitive
again. Further, it should be possible to do so in a manner to promote,
rather than inhibit, market forces. There is wide agreement that closer
cooperation between industry, labor and government is a sine qua non.
One way to achieve this would be to condition government help to firms
in declining industries, whether in the form of escape clause import relief
or domestic benefits, upon express commitments to restructure and to as-
148 See, e.g., Kaus, Can Creeping Socialism Cure Creaking Capitalism?, HARPER's, Feb.
17, 1983.
144 Reich, supra note 3, at 878.
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sume at least a modicum of responsibility for the adjustment of workers
and affected communities. While such commitments on behalf of an en-
tire industry would require changes in our antitrust laws, which might not
be possible without undermining their underlying principles, it should be
possible to devise certain limited arrangements in order to promote the
transition from a declining industry to a growth industry.
Another suggested technique would require that government
financial assistance be provided on a matching basis, with the industry
(or firms) investing half of the necessary funds before the government
contributes its share.'45 Whatever adjustment bargains are struck should
involve mutual commitments regarding worker retraining and relocation,
any necessary modernization of the infrastructure by government, explicit
industry (or company) plans for restructuring to become competitive, and
aid to injured communities. Without such plans and agreements, the ben-
efits of government assistance are likely to be frittered away, with work-
ers, managerial staff and capital remaining frozen in industries facing
shrinkage as America's level of interdependence grows.
Surely, one of the first tasks of government is to undertake to coordi-
nate the already-existing fragmented government policies and programs
which affect an industry's health and competitiveness. Import relief, loans
and guarantees, price supports, subsidies, special tax provisions, antitrust
proscriptions and prosecutions, regulatory actions, government procure-
ment and other government actions have been put in place in a piecemeal
fashion with no awareness of the aggregate impact and no sense of the
industry as a whole.148 A modest beginning could be made by requiring
that agencies proposing new regulations impacting industries accompany
them with a "competitive impact statement" describing the regulation's
anticipated favorable or unfavorable effects on the industry's long-term
international competitiveness. A coordinated view of existing programs
and their effect on competitiveness will provide a better perspective for
determining whether new incentives and assistance for sunset and sunrise
industries, such as new tax incentives, research and development support,
financing, or modified antitrust rules, may be needed.
Experience dictates that the debate regarding where the responsibil-
ity should be vested for implementing such programs may be as heated as
that over their substance. The program coordination function could best
be carried out by a new entity within the White House, similar to the
National Security Council."14 Obviously, these proposals run counter to
"I Kaus, supra note 143, at 20.
14' Reich, supra note 3, at 877.
147 See Wheeler, Pepper & Janow, Implications of Japanese Industrial Development
Policies in the 1980's for U.S. Trade and Investment (Hudson Institute), summarized in
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Busmss AMERCA (Nov. 1, 1982). A more modest step would be
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efforts to reduce the federal bureaucracy, budget and involvement in the
affairs of industry. There is, nevertheless, a growing consensus that, with
the nation's economic future at stake, government has a proper, even es-
sential, role in the process of providing for industry adjustment and pro-
moting leading-edge technologies and industries. President Reagan ac-
knowledged as much in his January 1983, State of the Union address:
"Education, training and retraining are as fundamental to our success as
are research, development, and productivity. Labor, management, and
government at all levels can and must participate in improving these tools
of growth. Tax policy, regulatory practices, and Government programs all
need constant re-evaluation in terms of our competitiveness." 4 8
If such coordination in the government's approach can be achieved, it
will likely lessen the pressure on industry to resort to "quick-fix" options,
such as the escape clause, as a means of solving its problems. The escape
clause would be improved by requiring, if antitrust hurdles can be over-
come, that petitioners be in a position to design and carry out a detailed
and effective adjustment plan, that such a plan be submitted with the
petition and that import relief be conditioned on the successful negotia-
tion of binding agreements between the petitioners and the government
containing mutual obligations regarding adjustment. Administration of
the law would be improved by limiting import relief to a maximum of five
years and requiring that the International Trade Commission designate,
and pay for, representatives of consumers and the national interest (in
the form of a government representative) to participate in in the investi-
gation. In addition, five years after the termination of any import relief,
the Commission should be required to analyze and report on the effec-
tiveness of the relief granted.
With a coordinated approach and the implementation of the pro-
posed changes in the law, the escape clause may become one potentially
useful element, but no more than that, in a comprehensive package of
government support for the adjustment of injured industries.
Finally, a more imaginative, non-adversarial and non-confrontational
approach to shaping and implementing escape clause remedies in a pro-
competitive, rather than anti-competitive, manner merits exploration.
This would involve a procedure wherein foreign governments of the prin-
cipal supplier countries may participate in the shaping and implementa-
tion of an industry adjustment program. The concerned foreign govern-
ments may make available financial, technical and other resources jointly
to require that the Council of Economic Advisors report annually on American industrial
competitiveness on a sector-by-sector basis and state the effect of various government poli-
cies thereon, with suggestions for change. Tsongas, Atarizing Reagan, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1,
1983, at A23, col. 1, 2-3.
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with the domestic resources assembled by the U.S. government in imple-
mentation of the adjustment package.1 49
This approach makes both political and economic sense. Given the
underlying technology-driven economic process, inexorably pushing na-
tional economies into increasingly higher levels of economic interdepen-
dence, the problem of economic injury incurred from imports may in-
crease rather than recede in the near term. This prospect suggests
increased internal political pressures for protection more likely designed
to achieve anti-competitive rather than pro-competitive solutions. This
would not serve the longer-term national interest in increasing productiv-
ity, upgrading quality and promoting international competitiveness of the
U.S. industrial base.
Viewed from the standpoint of U.S. trading partners, to the extent
the international competitiveness of injured U.S. industries can be quick-
ly restored or its resources rapidly shifted to more competitive product
areas through the partners' direct participation in a truly effective adjust-
ment program, the cumulative effect of such effort will serve to maintain
the openness of U.S. markets.
The present U.S. approach, already largely discredited, of combining
a compensatory approach to industry adjustment by restricting imports
will, more likely than not, lead to other anti-competitive restrictions,
erode important international relationships and, more importantly, retard
efforts to upgrade the competitiveness of the U.S. industrial base, thereby
encouraging the survival of the less competitive elements composing that
base.
'l Such a collaborative approach to resolve trade disputes through non-confrontational
means was explored in the relief phase of the imported motorcycles escape clause case. U.S.
INT'L TRADE COMMISSION, HEAVYWEIGHT MOTORCYCLES, AND ENGINES AND POWER TRAIN SUB-
ASSEMBLIES THEREFORE (Investigation No. TA-201-47), U.S.LT.C. Pub. No. 1342, 48 Fed.
Reg. 6043 (1983)(determination of threat of serious injury). This involved informal consider-
ation of a financial and technical assistance package put together by certain Japanese mo-
torcycle manufactures to restore the viability of Harley-Davidson Motor Co., Inc., the sole
applicant, as an alternative to the possible five-year imposition of prohibitive tariffs. Honda,
Yamaha and Suzuki May "Save" Harley-Davidson, Japan Economic Journal, Mar. 15,
1983, at 3, col. 4.
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